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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Curtis Hollon appeals from his judgment of conviction and challenges the district court's
ruling that Mr. Hollon may not elicit expert testimony or argue to the jury regarding the
absorption of alcohol-the possibility that Mr. Hollon's Breath Alcohol Content ("BAC") rose
or fell between when he was driving to when he was tested, 46 minutes later. Mr. Hollon asserts
that the district court abused its discretion by failing to act consistently with the applicable legal
standards, because the court's decision is incorrect in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Austin, 163 Idaho 378 (2018), in which the Court abrogated State v.

Tomlinson, 159 Idaho 112 (Ct. App. 2015).
Mr. Hollon also contends that the district court violated his right to due process by
unconstitutionally prohibiting his right to present a complete defense.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
At approximately 1:00 in the morning on September 19, 2015, Corporal Arrington
stopped Mr. Hollon's vehicle for speeding. (Tr., p.159, Ls.21-25; p.161, Ls.7-17; p.162, Ls.1321.) Mr. Hollon admitted to drinking one beer and one shot earlier that night. (Tr., p.164, Ls.59.)

Mr.

Hollon

performed

field

sobriety

tests

(FSTs).

(Tr.,

p.165,

Ls.5-7.)

Corporal Arrington only observed nystagmus in the right eye, and only at maximum deviationthere was no nystagmus prior to the 45 degree mark; thus, Mr. Hollon passed the horizontal
nystagmus test. (Tr., p.171, Ls.18-23; p.172, Ls.7-18; p.235, Ls.16-25.) During the walk and

1

tum test, Mr. Hollon missed heel to toe on a few steps and also stepped off the line. 1 (Tr., p.174,
Ls.13-18.) On the third test, the one-leg stand test, Mr. Hollon would count to ten, then stop. He
also swayed, lifted his arms, and dropped his foot during the three times the officer had him
perform the test. (Tr., p.176, Ls.2-19.) Mr. Hollon was then asked to perform two non-standard
tests:

(1) to recite the alphabet from "C" to "W" and to count backwards from 63 to 42. 2

(Tr.,p.177, L.1 - p.178, L.6; p.178, Ls.9-16; p.236, L.23 - p.237, L.19.) He completed the
alphabetic test with only a little difficulty, but inserted the number "11" between "G" and "H."
(Tr., p.177, L.19 - p.178, L.6.) As for the fifth and final test, the backwards count from 63 to 42,
Mr. Hollon performed admirably in counting backwards from 63 to 50, at which point he
stopped and asked what number he was supposed to stop at. (Tr., p.178, Ls.19-22.) Mr. Hollon
continued with the test without any error. (Tr., p.178, Ls.22-23.) At that point Mr. Hollon was
informed that he was being detained for further investigation. (Tr., p.179, L.23 - p.180, L.3.)
Officer Arrington put Mr. Hollon in the back of his patrol car for a fifteen minute
"observation period" prior to administering breath tests. (Tr., p.180, Ls.1-6.) During that period
Mr. Hollon burped and the time had to be restarted. (Tr., p.183, Ls.13-25.) After that periodapproximately 56 minutes after he was originally stopped-Mr. Hollon gave two breath samples.
(Tr., p.184, L.8 - p.186, L.8.) The results of the two sufficient samples showed an alcohol
concentration of .092 and .100. (Tr., p.198, L.23 -p.199, L.2; State's Exhibits 1, 2.)

1

Although the vehicle Officer Arrington was using that day had audio and visual recording
capabilities, both were malfunctioning. Officer Arrington' s reasons varied as to why he was
unable to record any of Mr. Hollon's driving patterns or indicia of intoxication. (Tr., pp.222223.)
2
Corporal Arrington admitted that he had received no training on what cues to look for when
conducting the non-standard tests. (Tr., p.238, Ls.11-14.)

2

Mr. Hollon was charged by Information with operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol. (R., pp.33-35.) The State charged Mr. Hollon under alternate theories: it
alleged that he was driving while under the influence and/or driving with an alcohol
concentration of .08 or more (a per se violation). (R., p.34.) The DUI was charged as a felony
because Mr. Hollon had a previous felony DUI conviction within the preceding fifteen years.
(R., p.34; See State's Exhibit 3.)
Prior to trial, the State disclosed that it intended to call Corporal Wendler, who would
testify as an expert witness regarding rising and falling BAC. (R., pp.44-46.) The pleading
indicated that Corporal Wendler would testify to "the length of time it takes for alcohol to rise,
peak and decline in a person's body and that alcohol concentration peaks approximately 30
minutes to 1 hour after alcohol consumption stops." (R., p.45.) Corporal Wendler testified, but
did not offer any testimony regarding alcohol absorption rates. (See Tr., p.269, L.1 - p.303,
L.10.)
During the defense's cross-examination of Corporal Arrington, the State's primary law
enforcement witness, the defense asked the officer about the absorption of alcohol. (Tr., p.242,
Ls.23-25.) The prosecutor objected and asked the district court to preclude the defense from
eliciting rising BAC testimony from the witness. (Tr., p.243, Ls.1-25.) The prosecutor argued
that Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Department of Transportation, 153 Idaho 200 (2012), and State v.

Tomlinson, 159 Idaho 112 (Ct. App. 2015), stood for the proposition that, if the state can show
that the breathalyzer has been properly calibrated and is properly working, the defense cannot
bring up rising BAC. (Tr., p.243, Ls.18-25; p.245, L.2 - p.246, L.15.)
The defense reminded the court that the State disclosed a summary of expected testimony
of Officer Wendler, which included "the time that alcohol takes to rise, peak, and decline.
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Alcohol concentration peaks, approximately, 30 minutes to an hour. Alcohol metabolization,"
and a myriad of subjects. (Tr., p.245, Ls.4-15.) Defense counsel also argued that the case law
that had developed in this area was wrong. (Tr., p.245, Ls.8-9; p.246, Ls.19-22.)
The district court ruled that the State's summary of expected testimony, as disclosed
during the discovery process, was not sufficient to open the door any further. (Tr., p.248, Ls.1525; R., pp.44-47.) The district court also stated that it had reviewed Tomlinson and Elias Cruz,
finding both cases "st[ oo ]d for the proposition that the metabolism of alcohol-what a person
was when they were driving is irrelevant." (Tr., p.249, Ls.1-6.) The district court ruled that,
while defense counsel believed the law was wrong, these cases have not been overruled by the
appellate court and so the holdings are binding. (Tr., p.249, Ls.7-18.) The court sustained the
objection on that basis and directed defense counsel "not to inquire about what went on between
the period of the time of the stop and the test. I don't think it's relevant." (Tr., p.249, L.19 p.250, L.2.)
After the State rested, the district court then reminded the parties that it had formally
ruled "that neither party is to discuss during closings any notion of extrapolation or the fact that
it took 45 minutes between the stop and the test affecting the number." (Tr., p.314, Ls.18-24.)
The court explained, "I don't think that is relevant under Tomlinson and any such argument
would be improper." (Tr., p.314, L.24 - p.315, L.1.) Both parties refrained from mentioning
rising BAC during their closing remarks to the jury. (Tr., p.325, L.14 -p.367, L.15.)
Ultimately, the jury found Mr. Hollon guilty of DUI, and he admitted his prior felony
DUI history. (R., p.143; Tr., p.378, L.19-p.379, L.24.) However, the jurors were not instructed
that they needed to agree on a particular theory, so there was no indication as to whether he was
convicted under the per se theory, the driving under the influence theory, or both. (R., pp.134,
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143; Tr., p.320, Ls.11-14.) The district court sentenced Mr. Hollon to ten years, with five years
fixed. (R., pp.156-161, 189-194.) An Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for leniency was timely
filed, but the district court denied the motion without a hearing. (R., pp.209-226.) Mr. Hollon
filed a Notice of Appeal that was timely from the district court's re-entered judgment of
conviction. 3 (R., pp.195-197, 204-208.)

3

The Idaho Supreme Court conditionally dismissed Mr. Hollon's appeal as untimely; however,
pursuant to a post-conviction stipulation, the judgment of conviction was re-entered on June 12,
2018. (R., pp.175, 178, 186-194.)
5

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion and violate Mr. Hollon's due process right to present a
defense when it prohibited him from eliciting testimony or arguing regarding a rising Breath
Alcohol Content?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Prohibited Testimony And Argument As To
Rising Breath Alcohol Content Violating Mr. Hollon's Constitutional Right To Present A
Complete Defense

A.

Introduction
Idaho's DUI statute unambiguously states that driving with an alcohol concentration over

the legal limit is unlawful. Therefore, one element the State must prove is that the driver's
alcohol concentration was over the legal limit, at the time of driving. As due process requires the
State to prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, scientific evidence regarding
Mr. Hollon's breath alcohol concentration when he was driving was relevant, and Mr. Hollon
should have been allowed to present that evidence and argument to rebut the State's test result
evidence, and to present a complete defense. In prohibiting Mr. Hollon from eliciting testimony
or arguing that his BAC at the time he was driving was different than when he was tested, 46
minutes later, the district court relied on the Court of Appeals' holding in Tomlinson. However,
since the district court's decision, the Idaho Supreme Court decided State v. Austin, 163 Idaho
378 (2018), a case in which the Court held:
The Tomlinson decision erroneously extended the irrelevancy of a driver's actual
alcohol concentration while driving-not required in the State's case-in-chief and
not admissible as it relates to a machine's margin of error-to deny a defendant's
right to present contrary evidence in his defense. Although the district court
understandably relied on Tomlinson, its decision was not consistent with legal
standards. Thus, the district court abused its discretion in granting the State's
motion in limine and denying Austin's expert testimony as it related to the
statute's per se section.
163 Idaho at 382. In Mr. Hollon's case, the district court understandably relied on Tomlinson,
but its decision was not consistent with legal standards. Thus, the district court in this case
similarly abused its discretion in sustaining the State's objection and prohibiting argument
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regarding a rising BAC, and Mr. Hollon's judgment of conviction must be vacated and the case
remanded for a new trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
The admission of expert testimony is reviewed to determine whether the lower court

abused its discretion. State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 875 (1995). In reviewing a trial court's
decision for an abuse of discretion, the relevant inquiry regards four factors:
Whether the trial court: ( 1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.

Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018). The relevance of evidence is a question
of law and therefore the reviewing court examines the district court's determination that
evidence is relevant de nova. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764 (1993). A trial court's
factual findings are entitled to deference unless they are clearly erroneous, but the determination
as to whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied is subject to free review. State v.

Lewis, 144 Idaho 64, 66 (2007).

C.

Under The Plain Language Of Idaho Code § 18-8004(1), And As Analyzed By The
Austin Court, Evidence Of The Driver's Alcohol Concentration While Driving Is Plainly
Relevant; Thus, The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Act Consistently
With The Applicable Legal Standards
Mr. Hollon had a right to elicit testimony that his alcohol concentration, when he was

driving, may not have been over the legal limit.

However, the district court held that such

evidence was irrelevant under Elias-Cruz and Tomlinson. (See Tr., p.249, Ls.1-6.) After the
district court ruled on the motion, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in Austin, in
which it abrogated Tomlinson. 163 Idaho at 382. However, given that Elias-Cruz concerned the
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margin of error inherent in the machinery used for breath testing, and Tomlinson has been
abrogated, the district court abused its discretion in holding that the defense could not elicit
testimony or make an argument that Mr. Hollon's BAC could have risen to 0.092/0.100 after he
ceased driving, because it did not apply the applicable legal standards or reach its decision
through an exercise of reason.
The conduct prohibited by statute reads as follows: "It is unlawful for any person who is
under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substances, or who has an alcohol
concentration of .08, as defined in subsection (4) of this section, or more, as shown by an
analysis of his blood, breath, or urine, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
.... " Idaho Code § 18-8004(1)(a) (emphasis added). Clearly, the statute makes driving under
the influence illegal. Therefore, a conclusion that evidence of a driver's condition while driving
is irrelevant to his defense is unreasonable and misinterprets precedent.
The Idaho pattern jury instructions list the elements as follows: (1) On or about a certain
date; (2) in the State ofldaho; (3) the defendant drove or was in actual physical control of; (4) a
motor vehicle; (5) upon a highway, street or bridge or upon public or private property open to the
public; (6) while under the influence of alcohol or while having an alcohol concentration of0.08
or more as shown by an analysis of the defendant's blood, urine, or breath. (ICJI 1000 (emphasis
added).)
During the defense's cross-examination of Corporal Arrington, the defense asked the
officer about the absorption of alcohol. (Tr., p.242, Ls.23-25.) The prosecutor objected and
asked the district court to preclude the defense from eliciting rising BAC testimony from the
witness. (Tr., p.243, Ls.1-25.) The prosecutor argued that Elias-Cruz stood for the proposition
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that, if the state can show that the breathalyzer has been properly calibrated and is properly
working, the defense cannot bring up rising BAC. (Tr., p.243, Ls.18-25.)
The defense reminded the court that the State disclosed a summary of expected testimony
of Officer Wendler, which included “the time that alcohol takes to rise, peak, and decline.
Alcohol concentration peaks, approximately, 30 minutes to an hour. Alcohol metabolization,”
and a myriad of subjects. (Tr., p.245, Ls.4-15.) Defense counsel also argued that the case law
that had developed in this area was wrong. (Tr., p.245, Ls.8-9; p.246, Ls.19-22.)
The district court ruled that the State’s summary of expected testimony, as disclosed
during the discovery process, was not sufficient to open the door any further. (Tr., p.248, Ls.1525; R., pp.44-47.) The district court found that, under Elias-Cruz and Tomlinson, evidence of
Mr. Hollon’s alcohol concentration while he was driving was not relevant. (Tr., p.249, Ls.1-6.)
The court sustained the objection on that basis and directed defense counsel “not to inquire about
what went on between the period of the time of the stop and the test. I don’t think it’s relevant.”
(Tr., p.249, L.19 – p.250, L.2.)
The cases the district court cited, Tomlinson and Elias-Cruz, relied on earlier cases that
stand for the proposition that the State does not have to extrapolate back from the time of test
results to prove a per se theory of a violation of the statute—as distinct from the impairment
theory, where the State must provide such evidence if it intends to introduce evidence of alcohol
concentration to support the impairment charge. See State v. Sutliff, 97 Idaho 523 (1976);
State v. Robinette, 141 Idaho 110 (2005). But it is an illogical, and unconstitutional, leap to say
that because the State is not required to prove something, the defendant is not even permitted to
introduce evidence of it.
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Soon after the district court’s rulings, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in
State v. Austin, 163 Idaho 378 (2018), in which it abrogated Tomlinson. Although the district
court did not have the benefit of Austin in ruling on the objection, nonetheless, Mr. Hollon
asserts that the district court’s decision was an abuse of discretion where it failed to apply the
correct legal standards because the Court’s decision in Austin clarified the case law in this area.
The Austin Court considered the question of the relevancy of an expert testimony
regarding a driver’s actual alcohol concentration while driving when the driver is charged under
the “per se” DUI provision. 163 Idaho at 379. In Austin, the Court held that Tomlinson went too
far in holding that not only was the State not required to extrapolate alcohol concentration back
to the time a defendant was driving or in control of a vehicle, where the Tomlinson Court held
that “the alcohol concentration in a defendant’s blood, breath, or urine at the time he or she was
driving is irrelevant.” Id. (quoting Tomlinson at 122). The Austin Court abrogated Tomlinson,
holding it “erroneously extended the irrelevancy of a driver’s actual alcohol concentration while
driving . . . to deny a defendant’s right to present contrary evidence in his defense.” 163 Idaho at
382.
However, evidence as to Mr. Hollon’s alcohol concentration at the time he was driving
was relevant to the weight to be afforded the test results because the tests were given long after
he was driving. Evidence “having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without he evidence” is relevant. I.R.E. 401. Here, one fact that was of consequence to the
determination of the action was what Mr. Hollon’s alcohol concentration was while he was
driving. That is why the lapse of time between when a defendant drives and when he takes the
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test is relevant to the weight of test results. Therefore, expert testimony regarding the effect( s) of
that lapse of time is also relevant.
Evidence of the effects of that lapse of time should have been provided to the jury. "If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by know ledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
I.R.E. 702.
Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it relied on Tomlinson to prohibit
testimony or argument regarding a rising BAC, because it did not apply the applicable legal
standards or reach its decision though an exercise of reason. 4

D.

The District Court Violated Mr. Hollon's Right To Due Process When It Sustained The
State's Objection And Ordered The Parties Not To Discuss Extrapolation Or The Effect
On The BAC Because Mr. Hollon Had A Constitutional Right To Present Evidence That
The Concentration Of Alcohol In His Breath, While He Was Driving, Was Not Over The
Legal Limit
By ruling "neither party is to discuss during closings any notion of extrapolation or the

fact that it took 45 minutes between the stop and the test affecting the number at all," the district
court violated Mr. Hollon's right to due process, because it denied him the opportunity to put on
a complete defense. (Tr., p.314, Ls.20-24.) Idaho Code§ 18-8004(1) makes it clear that one of
the elements of the crime of driving under the influence is having an alcohol concentration over
the limit while driving.

As held by the Austin Court, Tomlinson misstated the law when it

concluded that expert testimony offered by the defendant as to his condition while driving is
irrelevant and cannot be used to defend a charge that the statute was violated.

4

Indeed,

The district court's reliance on Tomlinson also created confusion over the appropriate jury
instructions. (See Tr., pp.314-315.)
12

Tomlinson’s conclusion that a defendant would not be allowed to present evidence of his
condition while driving is flawed and misinterprets precedent.

This led to a violation of

Mr. Hollon’s right to due process.
Every defendant has a due process right to present a defense to each element of the crime
of which he is accused.

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that the U.S.

Constitution provides defendants “‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’”
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479,
485 (1984)); see also U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; ID. CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 13; Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (declaring that “[t]he right of an accused in a criminal trial
to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s
accusations”). Limiting the types of evidence that a defendant presents in his defense may
violate the defendant’s right to due process, compulsory process, and confrontation. See U.S.
CONST. amends. VI, XIV; ID. CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 13.
Further, the United States Supreme Court has “explicitly held” that “the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 364 (1970).
The district court—despite acknowledging defense counsel’s concerns that the precedent
was wrong, noted that the cases, including Tomlinson, constituted binding precedent upon it, and
said, “certainly, if there is a need to look at those, this might be a prime case to have it reviewed
if there is a conviction here. But for now, I will sustain the objection and direct you not to
inquire about what went on between the period of the time of the stop and the test. I don’t think
it’s relevant.” (Tr., p.249, L.15 – p.250, L.2.) The district court clearly felt bound by that
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precedent and relied on Tomlinson's suggestion that a defendant's evidence of his condition
while driving is irrelevant. (Tr., p.11, Ls.1-6.) Although understandable, Mr. Hollon asserts that
the court's decision, in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Austin, was erroneous and
it resulted in a violation of Mr. Hollon's due process right to raise a complete defense.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hollon respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction,
reverse the district court's order sustaining the State's objection, and order a new trial wherein
the district court will properly admit testimony, evidence, and argument regarding his alcoho 1
concentration when he was driving.
DATED this 7th day of May, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
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